

## CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PAGE 1 OF 5

REFERENCE DESIGNATOR: TBA-2  
 NAME / QUANTITY: BOX DOOR (2)  
 DRAWING/REFERENCE: H101-322B(LT)2002(RT)

PROJECT: HST  
 LRU NAME / QUANTITY: BOX DOOR (2)  
 LRU PART NUMBER: 10101-32201-01(LT)2002-01(RT)

SUBSYSTEM: TOOL BOX  
 EFFECTIVITY: ALL ORBITERS

FAILURE MODE NUMBER HST-TBA-2-1	CRITICALITY 1R/2	FAILURE EFFECT	RETENTION RATIONALE
<b>FUNCTION</b>  The tool box RT/LT doors enclose the box, contain all equipment within the box as well as serve as a storage location for some tools.		<b>END ITEM</b> Cannot close or remove door from the tool box if the door positioning system is jammed.	<b>DESIGN</b> I. Design Feature to Minimize the Chance of the Failure Mode  A. Design All tool box components were designed to a structural safety factor of 2.0.
<b>FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE MODE</b>  Door(s) stuck in the deployed position.  <b>CAUSE(S)</b>  1.) Door positioning system is jammed due to: a.) Piece part failure b.) Contamination 2.) Getting in the door hinges.		<b>MISSION</b> Mission objectives are complete.	B. Tolerances Sufficient tolerances will be used in the door positioning system and door hinge design to prevent jamming by expansion and contraction of material due to temperature extremes or on-orbit use.  C. Materials - Major Components  1. Door Positioning System: Bar - 15-5PH H1050, Plunger - CRIES 304 Cord A 2. Door Hinges: 15-5 PH 1025, AL Bronze 650
<b>REDUNDACY SCORE(S)</b> A - Pass B - N/A C - Pass	<b>REMAINING PATH(S)</b> 1.) Remove doors by removing the one 7/16 in. hex head bolts from the door hinges and from the check bar attachment location to the doors.	<b>CREW / VEHICLE</b> Possible damage to the orbiter if door and/or box contents become loose in the payload bay.	<b>II. Testing and Analysis</b> A. Acceptance Testing 1. PDA  A full pre-delivery acceptance (PDA) test will be performed on the tool box assembly before it is delivered to JSC for the beginning of the certification process. The PDA will verify that the door positioning system and hinges are operating correctly and that the assembly is clean.
<b>MISSION PHASE</b>	<b>CORRECTIVE ACTION TIMES</b>		2. Vibration  The flight tool box will be exposed to acceptance vibration loads while it is in flight configuration. The test will verify that the door positioning system or hinge assembly will withstand the vibration loads.
EVA	Hour	Minutes	

PREPARED BY: J.F. PARK

REVISION: BASIC

SUPERSEDED DATE: NONE

DATE: 3/6/03

## CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

REFERENCE DESIGNATOR: TBA-2  
 NAME / QUANTITY: BOX DOOR (2)  
 DRAWING REFERENCE: 10101-300811, L720200(RT)

PROJECT: HST  
 LRU NAME / QUANTITY: BOX DOOR (2)  
 LRU PART NUMBER: 10101-300811(L720200(RT))

PAGE 2 OF 5  
 SUBSYSTEM: TOOL BOX  
 EFFECTIVITY: ALL ORBITERS

FAILURE MODE NUMBER HST-TBA-2-1		CRITICALITY 1R/2	FAILURE EFFECT	RETENTION RATIONALE																																													
<b>FUNCTION</b>		<b>END ITEM</b> Cannot close or remove door from the tool box if the door positioning system is jammed.				<b>DESIGN</b>																																											
<b>FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE</b>  <b>MODE</b> Door(s) stuck in the deployed position.		<b>MISISON</b> Mission objectives are complete.				A. Acceptance Testing (continued) The following vibration levels are per SMD memo ES42-92-134: <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Frequency (Hz)</th> <th>Slope (dB/oct.)</th> <th>Constant Level (dB<sup>2</sup>/Hz)</th> <th>Overall Grade</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>20-80</td> <td>+3.0</td> <td></td> <td>6.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>80-350</td> <td></td> <td>.04</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>350-2000</td> <td>-3.0</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>20-45</td> <td>+10.0</td> <td></td> <td>7.7</td> </tr> <tr> <td>45-600</td> <td></td> <td>.08</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>600-2000</td> <td>-6.0</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>20-70</td> <td>+4.0</td> <td></td> <td>7.0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>70-800</td> <td></td> <td>.05</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>800-2000</td> <td>-6.0</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> B. Certification Testing		Frequency (Hz)	Slope (dB/oct.)	Constant Level (dB <sup>2</sup> /Hz)	Overall Grade	20-80	+3.0		6.1	80-350		.04		350-2000	-3.0			20-45	+10.0		7.7	45-600		.08		600-2000	-6.0			20-70	+4.0		7.0	70-800		.05		800-2000	-6.0				
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<b>CAUSE(S)</b> 1.) Door positioning system is jammed due to: a.) Piece part failure b.) Contamination 2.) Galling in the door hinges.		<b>CREW / VEHICLE</b> Possible damage to the orbiter if door and/or box contents become loose in the payload bay.				1. Thermal Vacuum The Tool Box will be exposed to the following thermal vacuum environment. Push button actuation, door operation, and contingency bolts operation will be a part of the test plan.																																											
<b>REDUNDANCY SCREENS</b> a - Pass b - N/A c - Pass		<b>REMAINING PATH</b> 1.) Remove doors by removing the one 7/16 in. hex head bolts from the door hinges and from the check bar attachment location to the doors.				a. Temperature - Cold Side Only (amb. to -90°F) b. Pressure - ATM to 1x10 <sup>-5</sup> torr																																											
<b>MISSION PHASE</b>		<b>CORRECTIVE ACTION TIMES</b>																																															
<b>EVA</b>		TIME TO EFFECT	TIME TO CORRECT																																														
<b>EVA</b>		Hours	Minutes																																														

REVISION: BASIC

SUPERSEDING DATE: NONE

DATE: 11/30/92

PREPARED BY: J.P. PARK

## CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PAGE 3 OF 6  
SUBSYSTEM: TOOL BOX  
EFFECTIVITY: ALL ORBITERS

REFERENCE DESIGNATOR: TBA-2  
NAME / QUANTITY: BOX DOOR (2)  
DRAWING REFERENCE: 10181-20001-01(LT)20002-01(RT)

PROJECT: HST  
CIRU NAME / QUANTITY: BOX DOOR (2)  
CIRU PART NUMBER: 10181-20001-01(LT)20002-01(RT)

FAILURE MODE NUMBER HST-TBA-2-1	CRITICALITY 1R/2	FAILURE EFFECT	RETENTION RATIONALE
<b>FUNCTION</b>  The tool box R&L doors enclose the box, contain all equipment within the box as well as serve as a storage location for some tools.			<b>EMD ITEM</b> Cannot close or remove door from the tool box if the door positioning system is jammed.
<b>FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE</b>  <b>MODE</b>  Door(s) stuck in the deployed position.			<b>MISSION</b> Mission objectives are complete.
<b>CAUSE(S)</b>  1.) Door positioning system is jammed due to: a.) Poor part failure b.) Contamination 2.) Galling in the door hinges.			<b>CREW / VEHICLE</b> Possible damage to the orbiter if door and/or box contents become loose in the payload bay.
<b>RECOMMEND SCRATCHES</b> A - Pass B - N/A C - Pass			<b>INTERFACE</b> None.
<b>MISSION PHASE</b>		<b>CORRECTIVE ACTION TIMES</b>	
		TIME TO EFFECT	TIME TO CORRECT
EVA		Hours	Minutes

PREPARED BY: J. P. PARK

REVISION: BASIC

SUPERSEDING DATE: NONE

DATE: 08/08

## CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

REFERENCE DESIGNATOR: TBA-2  
 NAME / QUANTITY: BOX DOOR (2)  
 DRAWING REFERENCE: 10181-20201-Q(LT)20200(RT)

PROJECT: HST  
 LRU NAME / QUANTITY: BOX DOOR (2)  
 LRU PART NUMBER: 10181-30001-Q(LT)20200(RT)

PAGE 4 OF 5  
 SUBSYSTEM: TOOL BOX  
 EFFECTIVITY: ALL ORDERS

FAILURE MODE NUMBER HST-TBA-2-1		CRITICALITY 1R/2	FAILURE EFFECT	RETENTION RATIONALE		
<b>FUNCTION</b>		<b>END ITEM</b> Cannot close or remove door from the tool box if the door positioning system is jammed				
<b>FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE</b>  <b>MODE</b> Door(s) stuck in the deployed position.			<b>MISISON</b> Mission objectives are complete.	<b>DESIGN</b>  III. Inspection  A. Manufacturing  1. The door positioning system and door hinge components will be inspected prior to build-up for conformance to their applicable drawings.  2. All fracture critical piece parts will be inspected as described on their applicable drawings.  B. Assembly  1. Exterior assemblies will be cleaned and inspected to the levels described in section 3.53.5 of the HST SAD (10181-10081A). Once cleaned, the tool box will be completely bagged to prevent any contamination from entering the door positioning system or the door hinges.  C. Testing  1. The assembly will be fully inspected and functionally operated during PQA's and PIA's.  2. The hardware will be fully inspected for any signs of galling as a part of the pre/post functional tests performed prior to and immediately after all major certification and acceptance testing		
<b>REDUNDANCY SCREENS</b> A - Pass B - N/A C - Pass		<b>REMAINING PATHS</b> 1.) Remove doors by removing the cont. 7/16 in. hex head bolts from the door hinges and from the check bar attachment location to the doors.				
<b>MISSION PHASE</b>		<b>CORRECTIVE ACTION TIMES</b> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th style="text-align: left; width: 33%;">TIME TO EFFECT</th> <th style="text-align: left; width: 33%;">TIME TO CORRECT</th> </tr> </table>			TIME TO EFFECT	TIME TO CORRECT
TIME TO EFFECT	TIME TO CORRECT					
<b>EVA</b>		Hours	Minutes			

REVISION: BASIC

SUPERSEDING DATE: NONE

DATE: 13/2004

## CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

REFERENCE DESIGNATOR: TBA-2  
 NAME / QUANTITY: BOX DOOR (1)  
 DRAWING REFERENCE: 10101-30001(LT)2000(RT)

PROJECT: HST  
 LRU NAME / QUANTITY: BOX DOOR (1)  
 LRU PART NUMBER: 10101-30001-LT)2000-01(RT)

PAGE 6 OF 6  
 SUBSYSTEM: TOOL BOX  
 EFFECTIVITY: ALL ORIETERS

FAILURE MODE NUMBER HST-TBA-2-1	CRITICALITY 1R/2	FAILURE EFFECT	RETENTION RATIONALE
<b>FUNCTION</b>  The tool box ATA T doors enclose the box, contain all equipment within the box as well as serve as a storage location for some tools.		<b>END-ITEM</b> Cannot close or remove door from the tool box if the door positioning system is jammed.	<b>DESIGN</b>  <b>IV. Failure History</b> A. There have been no failures associated with the door positioning system or the door hinges.  <b>V. Operations</b> A. <b>Effect of Failure</b> Cannot close the door if the door positioning system is jammed. B. <b>Crew Actions</b> To activate the redundant path, the EVA crew will attach the EVA power tool or wrench to disengage the 7/16" hex-head bolts at the door hinges and the check bar attachment location. C. <b>Training</b> As part of the certification testing, crews will activate the redundant systems during the thermal vacuum tests. Additional training will occur in the WETF. D. <b>Mission Considerations</b> All contents in the box will have to be removed prior to landing in addition to the process listed in the crew actions section. E. <b>Initial Check-Outs</b> None.
<b>FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE MODE</b>  Door(s) stuck in the deployed position.		<b>MISSION</b> Mission objectives are complete.	
<b>CAUSES/SH</b>  1.) Door positioning system is jammed due to: a.) Piece part failure b.) Contamination 2.) Galling in the door hinges.		<b>CREW / VEHICLE</b> Possible damage to the orbiter if door end/or box contents become loose in the payload bay.	
<b>REDUNDACY SCREENS</b> A - Pass B - N/A C - Pass	<b>REPAIRING PATHS</b> 1.) Remove doors by removing the cont. 7/16 in. hex head bolts from the door hinges and from the check bar attachment location to the doors.	<b>INTERFACE</b> None.	
<b>MISSION PHASE</b>	<b>CORRECTIVE ACTION TIMES</b>		
	<b>TIME TO EFFECT</b>	<b>TIME TO CORRECT</b>	
EVA	Hours	Minutes	

PREPARED BY: J. F. PARK

REVISION: BASIC

SUPERSEDED NO DATE: NONE

DATE: 11/2000

HST-TBA-1-11